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The development of the terms *māyā*, *īśvara* and *saccidānanda* in the early Advaita Vedānta

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to determine when the concepts of *māyā*, *īśvara* and *saccidānanda* acquired the form that became common in the later Advaita Vedānta. In the case of the notion of *īśvara* which refers only to the conditioned *brahman*, the direction of this development has already been outlined by Śaṅkara. This tendency is evident in the Upaniṣadic commentaries. Maṇḍanamīśra played a decisive role in the idea that ignorance and *māyā* are the same, and that *māyā* is neither existing nor non-existent, but inexplicable. The root of the idea of *māyā* as the substance from which illusory phenomena is created, could be traced in Vācaspatimīśra and the concept is fully developed by Prakāśātman and Sarvajñātman. According to them, *māyā* is inexplicable, the same as *avidyā*, and at the same time the substance from which illusory phenomena are made. *Brahman* as *ānanda* is an old Upaniṣadic concept but the problem has arisen whether *ānanda* is a quality of *brahman* or *brahman*'s own being. Mandanamīśra with his discussion of *ānanda*, which cannot be a property of *brahman*, again played a crucial role in shaping this concept. Śaṅkara bypassed the problem, while his successors found a way to incorporate the idea into the system without violating the principle of the totality of *brahman*. The popular idea of *brahman* as existence, consciousness and bliss (*saccidānanda*) appeared rather late, firstly only as existence and

consciousness in Śaṅkara's Upadeśasahasrī, and then, probably from Sarvajñātman onwards, the formula takes its well-known form, although the compound is not yet fully stabilized as *sukha* appears interchangeably with *ānanda*.

Introduction

There is a certain level of discrepancy between the popular notions of Advaita Vedānta and the historical development of its concepts. Advaita Vedānta appears in contemporary discourse not only in scholarly discussions, but also in the popular discourse of the daily religious experience of the wider Hindu community, lay and monastic. In this paper I would not problematize these differences, but I would try to determine more precisely when and how certain concepts developed and acquired current outlines that are present at different levels of discourse, popular and scholarly.

Paul Hacker, in his 1950 article, systematically and precisely discussed terminological and conceptual differences between Śaṅkara and his successors. Although Hacker convincingly demonstrated key conceptual and terminological differences, it remained largely unclear when and under what circumstances these changes occurred. Hacker focused on the concepts of *avidyā* 'ignorance', *nāmarūpa* 'name and form', *māyā* 'ignorance', and *īśvara* 'Lord, God' and on the differences between Śaṅkara's understanding of these concepts and their properties in later Advaita Vedānta. For Hacker, this analysis serves only the purpose of establishing Śaṅkara's authorship. However, Hacker's analysis, in addition to verifying authorship, also has historical consequences because it points to the direction of the development of these concepts. One of earlier authors, mentioned by Hacker in his 1950 article, who also reflected more systematically on the differences between Śaṅkara and the later development of Advaita Vedānta was Svāmī Saccidānandendra (1880–1975).¹

¹ See Satchidanandendra (1998) where the author tries to distinguish Śaṅkara's original doctrine from later systematizations. In his 1929 work *Mūlāvīdyānirāsaḥ* in Sanskrit (translated by A.J. Alston in 1997 into English as "Heart of Sri Samkara"), the author, still under the name Subrahmaṇya (author's given name before ordination), singled out the peculiarities of Śaṅkara's use of the term *avidyā*. Hacker (1950, p. 257) mentions this work which served him as a confirmation of his own insights. Hacker also notes that in *Mūlāvīdyānirāsaḥ* all later characteristics of *avidyā*, which are foreign to Śaṅkara, can be found. Cf. also Satchidanandendra's magnum opus *Vedāntaprakriyāpratyabhijñā*

This paper will focus on three concepts: *māyā* “illusion”, *īśvara* “Lord, God” and *saccidānanda* “existence, consciousness, bliss”, and when and how they acquired the properties for which they are more widely known. In Śaṅkara, *māyā* is not yet a clearly defined philosophical concept, (*parama-*)*īśvara* is not yet used exclusively for the conditioned, lower *brahman*, while the term *saccidānanda* does not even appear in works that can reasonably be considered Śaṅkara’s.² The notion of *saccidānanda* can be linked to the concept of the *ānanda*-nature of *brahman* which is also foreign to Śaṅkara.

Māyā

Hacker (1950, pp. 268–272) argued that Śaṅkara in BSBh did not use the term *māyā* as a philosophical concept. The frequency of use of the term is surprisingly low compared to the importance of the term in later Advaita Vedānta.³ The fact is that in BSBh *māyā* is indeed used most often in terms of the illusory activity of a magician; *māyā* denotes

(available in A.J. Alston’s English rendering under the title “The Method of the Vedānta”, 1st ed. Kegan Paul International Limited, London, 1989).

² Brahmasūtrabhāṣya as a work that defines Śaṅkara as an author, is usually considered the standard for determining his authorship. Sureśvara in three passages (NaiṣS 4.74 and 4.76 and BĀUBhV 6.5.25), and Padmapāda in one (PañcP, third *maṅgala* verse) mention Śaṅkara by name. It follows from these and other claims that they were both disciples of Śaṅkara. Therefore, the commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad can be considered as authentic, together with the commentary on Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, also commented upon by Sureśvara. External evidence for Śaṅkara’s authorship of the Upadeśasāhasrī is provided by Mayeda (1973). The terminological correspondence along the Hacker’s criteria of BhGBh, Upad, KeUBh (both Pada and Vākya), ĪUBh with BSBh was established by Mayeda (1965a, 1965b, 1967, 1967–1968, 1973) and Andrijanić (2020a). Moreover, the stylometric analysis of Andrijanić (2020a and 2020b) and Andrijanić & Bałowski (forth.) confirms Śaṅkara’s authorship of all these works together with commentaries on Aitareya-, Muṇḍaka- and Praśna-Upaniṣad.

³ In the machine segmented text of the BSBh, *māyā* ‘illusion’ and *māyāvin* ‘magician’ occur 27 times which makes a very low frequency of 0.023%. The word count of BSBh is calculated using GRETEL e-text segmented by Jacek Bałowski, whom I would like to thank. Bałowski uses the machine-learning method of segmentation developed by Hellwig & Nehrdich (2018) according to which BSBh consists of around 117 391 words. This number is not entirely accurate and varies with respect to the convention how to separate (or not) certain compounds.

illusion or mirage and it is not used as a metaphysical concept.⁴ Śaṅkara describes *māyā* as deception (*alīka, vañcana*), and in a half of the cases where it occurs, *māyā* appears as *īśvara*'s miraculous creative power (Hacker 1950, p. 271). According to Hacker (1950, p. 272), such an idea of divine creativity came to Śaṅkara from Vaiṣṇava theological context. Furthermore, Śaṅkara never used the term *māyāvāda* to designate his doctrine.⁵ In the BSBh and BhGBh *māyā*, however, is not entirely devoid of its metaphysical dimension which is present in the examples in which *māyā* is described as belonging to the Lord. The metaphysical dimension of the term *māyā*, however, has completely disappeared in the Upaniṣad commentaries. Thus in BĀUBh the term *māyā* occurs only six times, in ChUBh and in KaUBh three times,⁶ while in TaittUBh, ĪUBh and MUBh *māyā* does not appear at all.⁷ In all these cases, *māyā* is only an illusion, a deceptive activity of a magician, never used in terms of the primary material or substance of which the illusory universe is made nor is it ever used as a synonym for *avidyā* as in the later Advaita Vedānta. Moreover, in Upaniṣad commentaries *māyā* is used only in incidental remarks as a parable by which Śaṅkara describes the illusory nature of the phenomenal world.⁸

Thus, three groups of Śaṅkara's texts can be distinguished with regard to the use and frequency of the term *māyā*. (1) *Māyā* occurs most frequently in BSBh, where, although it has no conceptual weight, it often appears as the miraculous or creative power of the Lord. In this context, it also occurs in BhGBh, as a miraculous power of Viṣṇu. Here it should be borne in mind that in the Gītā itself, the term is used as Kṛṣṇa's creative force.⁹ (2) In the commentary on the Gauḍapādīyakārikās, *māyā* appears as a metaphysical concept. But this is because in the *kārikās* itself (mostly in the second and

⁴ Hacker notes that there is an exception to this rule, and these are the cases in which the term *māyā* in the metaphysical sense appears in the text that Śaṅkara comments on. Such is the example of the commentary on Gauḍapādīyakārika 1.17; 2.12; 2.18; 3.11 etc. where *māyā* appears in a distinct philosophical sense.

⁵ Śaṅkara refers to his doctrine as *veda-*, *vedānta-*, *brahma-*, and *ātma-vāda* (Hacker 1950, p. 268).

⁶ BĀUBh 1.5.2; 2.3.6; 2.4.12; 2.5.19; 3.5.1; 4.3.9; KaUBh 3.12 (1.3.12); KaUBh 6.1 (2.3.1) (twice); ChUBh 5.10.1 (twice); 5.10.7.

⁷ For the very similar use of the term *māyā* in other Śaṅkara's works cf. Mayeda 1965a, pp. 172–183 (BhGBh); 1965b, pp. 184–186 (Upad); 1967, pp. 45–46 (KeUBh); 1967–1968, p. 78 (GKBh).

⁸ The term *māyā* appears in BhG and GK and Śaṅkara in his commentary gives the term some terminological weight while following the commentated text.

⁹ On the *māyā* as Viṣṇu's miraculous power in BhGBh see Mayeda 1965a, pp. 176–177.

third chapters) *māyā* appears as a more or less developed philosophical concept; as Śaṅkara's text is a commentary, it is natural that the concept of *māyā* also carries a certain conceptual weight. Still, even there *māyā* is not a primary material of the illusory appearances nor is it the same as *avidyā*; (3) On the other hand, in all commentaries on the Upaniṣads the term *māyā* plays almost no role, and occurs very rarely, mostly in parables where the world is compared to an illusionist's work.

From this it can be tentatively assumed that BSBh did not originate in the same period of Śaṅkara's literary activity when the commentaries on the Upaniṣads were composed.

Sureśvara does not use the term *māyā* in NaiṣkS. In the commentary on Śaṅkara's TaittUBh *māyā* appears several times, but in a very similar fashion as in Śaṅkara. In TaittUBhV 2.374 the differentiation of name and form (*nāmarūpa*) from Viṣṇu is compared with the work of a magician, and the magician is in 2.378 called *īśvara*. In the same verse, *īśvara* creates the world through *māyā*. The parallel with Śaṅkara is evident in the Vaiṣṇava theological context, as well as in the mention of *māyā* as *īśvara*'s creative power. In BĀUBhV 2.1.266, Sureśvara invokes the famous illustration of snake and rope to exemplify the claim that this whole world is just *māyā* and that the only truth is *ātman*. Sureśvara then quotes BhG 7.14 and 7.15 (BĀUBhV 2.1.269 and 270), two of the three *ślokas* where *māyā* is mentioned in BhG. Since the quoted verses are uttered by Kṛṣṇa himself, this belongs more to the Vaiṣṇava theological context than to the systematic philosophical elaboration of the concept.

Other Śaṅkara's followers, however, use the term *māyā* more as a philosophical and metaphysical concept. For Śaṅkara's disciple¹⁰ Padmapāda, *māyā* is no longer just an illusion but a factor that creates illusory phenomena, as well as the substance from which illusory phenomena are made. Thus in Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā (p. 10, line 8), the false appearance of silver in the shell consists of *māyā* (*māyāmaya*), while on p. 11, (line 5), the appearance of difference is manifested by *māyā* (*māyāvijṛmbhita*).¹¹ In Pañcapādikā *māyā*, however, occurs only nine times; although it is already taking on

¹⁰ In the monastic tradition, Śaṅkara's hagiographies and manuscript colophons, Padmapāda is always considered Śaṅkara's direct disciple. In addition to tradition, we may mention that Padmapāda mentions Śaṅkara by name in the third *maṅgala* stanza of his PañcP from which it may be inferred that Padmapāda was indeed Śaṅkara's disciple.

¹¹ It is interesting to note that Sureśvara, differently from Padmapāda, continues Śaṅkara's vague use of the term *māyā*. (see Andrijanić 2022)

the outlines of a metaphysical concept, the very rare occurrence of the term suggests that it is not so important for Padmapāda.

The later Advaita Vedānta development of the concept of inexplicability of *māyā* and *avidyā* as existent or non-existent is evidently due to Maṇḍanamiśra who strongly influenced Vimuktātman, Jñānaghana and Prakāśātman. The concept was developed in Brahmasiddhi (cf. from p. 9, line 11 to p. 10, line 2)¹² where the terms *avidyā*, *māyā* and *mithyāvabhāsa* are treated as synonyms. *Avidyā* is not *brahman*'s own nature or of anything else, it is not absolutely existing nor non-existent. If it were the own nature of something (different or non-different from it) it would be real, which is at odds with the basic idea of ignorance. Therefore, *avidyā* is inexpressible. Maṇḍanamiśra, however, still does not consider *māyā* / *avidyā* to be the material cause or substance out of which illusory phenomena are made, as post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta thinkers do. Although Maṇḍanamiśra considers *māyā* a synonym for *avidyā*, he also rarely uses the term.¹³ As Thrasher (1993, pp. 60–62) observes, Maṇḍanamiśra uses *māyā* only for some special purpose, or as an illustration.

Vācaspatimiśra also mentions *māyā* in Bhāmatī very rarely. In Bhāmatī 2.2.2 he states that *māyā* is manifested (*pratyupasthāpita*) name and form. A significant idea is set forth further when Vācaspatimiśra claims that *brahman* is the material cause of the world, but only when he is penetrated by *māyā* (*māyāveśa*). Here *māyā* has not yet been postulated as a material cause, as with later thinkers, but it has been brought into connection with it. The second important passage is Bhāmatī 1.4.3 wherein Vācaspatimiśra claims that *brahman*'s power of ignorance (*avidyāśakti*) is known as *māyā* and by other names. Obviously, Vācaspati does not yet display a tendency to systematize the teaching of *māyā*, which can be seen from the rare use of the term and from the fact that he does not resort to detailed elaboration of the ideas presented.

In Vimuktātman's Iṣṭasiddhi (c. 1000 AD) *māyā* is developed in a complex philosophical concept and *māyā* occurs much more frequently. Vimuktātman's theory of *māyā* is embedded into his defence of the *anirvacanīya-khyāti*, Advaitic view on error, against the views adopted in the other systems. Vimuktātman, just like Maṇḍanamiśra, often claims that *māyā* is inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*) both as real and

¹² Cf. Thrasher 1993: 1–2

¹³ The term appears 12 times, but twice in quotations (both times in the mentioned quotation from RS 6.47.18).

as unreal.¹⁴ In IṣṭS (1.34, p. 144; cf. 1.65), the material cause (*prakṛti*) of the universe is denoted by words such as *avidyā*, *māyā* and others;¹⁵ from *prakṛti*, illusions of *māyā* (*māyāmāyā*) appear. Elsewhere in Iṣṭasiddhi, the world is a product of *māyā*.¹⁶ In 1.119 manifest (*vyakti*) and unmanifest (*avyakti*) are assumed (*kalpate*) by *māyā*. Difference (*bheda*) is designated as *māyā* in 2.76; 7.19 etc.

Same as Vimuktātman in Iṣṭasiddhi, Jñānaghana in Tattvaśuddhi¹⁷ and Sarvajñātman in Saṃkṣepaśārīraka also follow Maṇḍanamīśra's footsteps and equate *māyā* with ignorance, both of which they denote as a substance out of which the illusory phenomena is made of. Thus, in Jñānaghana's Tattvaśuddhi (p. 31, line 3f) *māyā* is a material cause of the world (*jagadupādāna*).¹⁸ On p. 244, 8ff, after equating *ajñāna* 'ignorance' with *māyā*, Jñānaghana postulates *māyā* as different from *abhāva*.¹⁹ *Māyā* is, therefore, able to limit *brahman* that is (under the name *paramēśvara*) reflected in *māyā*. In Sarvajñātman's Saṃkṣepaśārīraka 1.318 *avidyā* is *māyā*, cause of the world (*māyā jagatprakṛtiḥ*); in 2.127 *avidyā* is called *māyā*, *tamas* 'darkness' *kāraṇa* 'cause' etc.

In Prakāśātman's Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa (PañcPV, pp. 31–32), the idea of the sameness of ignorance and *māyā* is discussed in detail and defended against a number of possible objections to their identity. Prakāśātman, citing ŚvU 4.10²⁰, considers that both *māyā* and ignorance are material causes (*upādāna*). Ignorance and *māyā* are the

¹⁴ I.e. 1.35; 1.62;

¹⁵ In his auto commentary on 1.34, Vimuktātman claims that other synonyms of *avidyā* besides *māyā* are *tamas*, *ākāśa*, *supta* etc. Cf. Padmapāda's PañcP (p. 20, lines 11–12) where it is said that *avidyā* can be denoted by various terms such as *māyā*, *tamas*, *ākāśa*, *supta*, *nāmarūpa*, *prakṛti*, *avyākṛta*, *avyakta* etc.

¹⁶ Cf. p. 32 ... *prapancasya māyānirmitatvābhyupagamāt...*; p. 36 ...*māyānirmitaṃ jagat...*

¹⁷ TŚ, p. 31, line 6: *ato 'dhyavasīyate brahmāśrayāvidyāmāyāvivarte 'yaṃ [bhūtabhautikalakṣaṇaḥ prapañca iti]* "Hence, it is an established fact that the physical world is an appearance or transfiguration of ignorance, known as *māyā*, which is located in Brahman." (tr. P.C. Subbama, in: Potter [ed.] 2006, p. 188.).

¹⁸ On p. 36, line 6f, *brahman* with the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of inexpressible *māyā* is a material cause (*upādāna*) of the world.

¹⁹ *Māyā* is neither *abhāva* nor *bhāva*, it is *anirvacanīya*, inexpressible.

²⁰ *Māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān* "One should recognize the illusory power as primal matter" (Olivelle 1998, p. 425) The same line is cited by Jñānaghana in TŚ, p. 31, line 2. *Māyā* is also in BhG 7.14 related to the *prakṛti* as Kṛṣṇa says that the word of his *māyā* consists in the three *guṇas*.

same thing as they (a) obscure one's own form, and (b) they have the capacity to manifest false phenomena. Prakāśātman (p. 32, lines 18–20), however, acknowledges one distinction in the use of terms *māyā* and *avidyā*: when the power of projection predominates (*vikṣepa-prādhānyena*), the term *māyā* is used, while *avidyā* is used when the power of concealment predominates (*ācchādāna-prādhānyena*). Terminologically, Prakāśātman's distinction reflects Maṇḍanamiśra's (BrahS pp. 149–150) division of ignorance into two sorts, concealing (*ācchādika*) and projective (*vikṣepika*).

The thesis that Advaita Vedānta distinguishes two powers of ignorance is very common: the “projecting power” (*vikṣepaśakti*) and the “concealment power” (*āvaraṇaśakti*) (cf. Vedāntasāra 10). Sarvajñātman in Saṃkṣepaśārīraka 1.20 mentions synonymous *vibhrama-*(instead of *vikṣepa*)-*śakti* and *āvaraṇaśakti*. The term *āvaraṇa* could come from Śaṅkara who in BĀUBh 2.1.12 interprets the word *ajñāna* from BĀU as *āvaraṇātma* “having the nature of concealment”. In this sense Prakāśātman retains Maṇḍanamiśra's terminology, and Sarvajñātman is terminologically more influenced by Śaṅkara, although the doctrine of the two *śaktis* of ignorance is not yet to be found in Śaṅkara.

It is interesting to note that Prakāśātman (rightly) states (p. 31, lines 14ff) that Maṇḍanamiśra (“Brahmasiddhikāra”) and Padmapāda (“Tīkākāra”) do not distinguish *māyā* from *avidyā*. The same he claims for the “author” of the Brahmasūtras (“Sūtrakāra”) and Śaṅkara (“Bhāṣyakāra”) where this is not the case.

When speaking of *māyā*, however, one should keep in mind that the outlines of the religious and philosophical conception of this term can be discerned before Śaṅkara. The term *māyā* appears quite often in Ṛksamhitā in a sense of magic power or artifice of Sun, Mitra and Varuṇa, Indra, Svarbhānu. Dasyus, enemies of Āryans in RS are accused of possessing cunning tricks (*māyā*)²¹. The term appears in BĀU 2.5.19;²² in PraśU 1.16; in ŚvU 1.10 and in ŚvU 4.9 and 4.10. *Māyā* appears in BhG 7.14–15 and 18.61 as a magical power of the Lord. In these passages, *māyā* is never connected to ignorance.

²¹ RS 4.16.9; 8.14.14; 10.73.5 (cf. Jamison & Brereton 2014, p. 56)

²² In a context of Indra's wizardry.

In Gauḍapādīyakārikā, however, *māyā* appears for 17 times; in 1.17 world of duality is mere *māyā*²³; in 2.16–19; 31 *māyā* is used in a sense of illusion (famous example of snake and rope) and is connected to the word *vikalpita* (imagined, cf. 1.7). In the third chapter oneness becomes different through *māyā*. In 3.26–29 it is elaborated that the origin of the existing (*sat*) is through *māyā*, while the non-existent (*asat*) is not possible even through *māyā*; in sleep and in the waking state, mind (*manas*) appears separated into subject and object through *māyā* (3.29 ≈ 4.61).²⁴ The period before Śāṅkara also includes an author whom Sarvajñātman calls Ātreya²⁵ and quotes him in Saṃkṣ̣Ṣ̣ 3.217. Ātreya claims that the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* cannot apply to what consists of *māyā* (*māyamaya*).

One more remark can be made here. Given how rarely *māyā* occurs in Śāṅkara’s works, and how insignificant its role is in Śāṅkara’s system, it is very unusual for Bhāskara to call Śāṅkara *māyāvādin* when referring to him. According to Kato (2011, pp. xxiv–xxv), where the most comprehensive account of the dating of Bhāskara can be found, he was only one generation younger than Śāṅkara. Bhāskara was familiar with Śāṅkara’s BSBh, Upadeśasāhasrī, commentaries on the Gītā and Upaniṣads. It is all the more surprising that Bhāskara chose the designation *māyāvādin* “one who asserts the doctrine of *māyā*” for Śāṅkara,²⁶ because *māyā* is obviously a second-rate term in Śāṅkara’s philosophy. Given the importance of the term, one would rather expect of Bhāskara to call Śāṅkara *avidyāvādin* or something similar. One possible explanation for this is that *māyā* in some non-Śāṅkara Advaita Vedānta circles (in the line with Gauḍapādīyakārikās) had a more prominent role, so Bhāskara thus generalizes and encompasses Śāṅkara with the term *māyāvādin*.

²³ According to Nakamura 2004, pp. 220–221 *māyā* here means “the wonderful power of a god”.

²⁴ Nakamura (2004, pp. 328–340) emphasizes that the theory that individual souls and the world came into being through *māyā* takes different forms in the second and in the third chapter. In the second chapter creation arises through *māyā* that resides in Lord and obscures him. The third chapter completely denies the existence of anything on the level of absolute truth; the *ātman* neither created nor creates.

²⁵ According to Nakamura (2004, p. 87) Ātreya is the author referred to elsewhere as Ācārya Taṅka, Brahmānandin (Nandin), Atrivaṃśa and Vākya-kāra. He might have lived about 500–550 AD (Nakamura 2004, p. 99) and composed a commentary (*vākya*) on the ChU.

²⁶ Śāṅkara’s followers mostly use the title bhāṣyakāra/bhāṣyakṛt. Cf. Hacker 1947/1978, pp. 44–46.

To summarize, the term *māyā* was already used before Śaṅkara, mostly as the creative and magical power of the god, often in the Vaiṣṇava religious context. In Gauḍapādīyakārikās, the outlines of *māya* as a philosophical concept also began to emerge. Śaṅkara and Sureśvara do not continue this direction of development. Maṇḍanamiśra, on the other hand, introduces the idea of the inexplicability of ignorance as existent or non-existent, and considers *māyā* as synonymous with ignorance. Padmapāda rarely uses the term, but gives it more terminological weight than Śaṅkara. Maṇḍanamiśra is followed by Vimuktātman, who equates ignorance and *māya*, but, unlike Maṇḍana, postulates them as the material cause of the world, as hinted by Vācaspatimiśra. The theory is finally elaborated and shaped in the most detailed and systematic manner by Prakāśātman.

Īśvara

In his 1950 article, Hacker singled out seven peculiarities in Śaṅkara's use of the term (*parama-*)*īśvara*. Here I will focus on the first feature (Hacker 1950, p. 276, 284–286) that seemed most important to me, and that is a certain level of terminological inconsistency in the use of the term and interchangeability with the term (*para-*)*brahman*. Simply put, Śaṅkara in BSBh very often uses the term *parameśvara*, and even *īśvara*, to denote the highest *brahman* in the absolute sense.²⁷ In the later Advaita Vedānta it became customary to distinguish *īśvara* as a term that denotes the conditioned *brahman* from (*param-*)*brahman*/*(parama-)**ātman* that is used for the absolute in the highest sense. In this chapter, I will try to determine when and why was this distinction established. Hacker (1950, p. 285) only points out that in the later Advaita Vedānta (Pañcadasī and Vedāntasāra) there is no longer interchangeability of these terms, thus establishing *terminus ante quem* for this development.

The first remark concerns the use of the term in Śaṅkara itself. There is no doubt that in BSBh the terms appear quite interchangeably. However, a careful review of the commentaries on the Upaniṣads, that can reasonably be considered Śaṅkaras, shows a

²⁷ There is no reason to cite examples here, a list of examples can be found in Hacker (1950, pp. 284–286) although this is an indisputable fact that is also visible even from a summary view of BSBh.

tendency to reduce the frequency of the use of the term (*parama-*)*īśvara*.²⁸ In BĀUBh, (*parama-*)*īśvara* appears much more often as a conditioned *brahman*. In fact, in only one example (BĀUBh 1.5.20, p. 709, lines 20f) *īśvara* clearly denotes the highest *brahman*.²⁹ Also, in TaittUBh, in only one passage (2.8.5, p. 309, line 26) *īśvara* denotes the highest *brahman*.³⁰ In ĪUBh 1, in three passages (*parama-*) *īśvara* is used as a synonym with (*parama-*) *ātman*, while in KaUBh in three passages (4.1 [2.1.1], 5.12 [2.2.12] and 6.19 [2.3.19]) *parameśvara* denotes the highest *brahman* (for details see Andrijanić 2020, pp. 265–266).

Thus, in Upaniṣad commentaries, (*parama-*)*īśvara* less often denotes the highest *brahman* than in BSBh, which is another indication that these commentaries originated in another period of Śaṅkara’s literary activity than BSBh.

One thing should also be emphasized. The terms for the conditioned and the highest *brahman*, however, are not entirely interchangeable. Although (*parama-*) *īśvara* very often means the highest *brahman* (much less often in the commentaries on the Upaniṣads), Śaṅkara does not use (*param-*)*brahman* and (*parama-*)*ātman* for the conditioned *brahman*. Such use of the term certainly paved the way for a later systematization that introduces a clear distinction between these two groups of terms.

In PañcP, the term (*parama-*)*īśvara* occurs only 13 times. Similar to Śaṅkara, it is not always easy to determine whether this term signifies the highest or conditioned *brahman*. However, on p. 75, line 3, Padmapāda speaks of omniscient *īśvara* in the highest sense (*paramārtha*), which cannot be known by valid modes of cognition, and which represents enjoyer’s own form (*bhokṛ*). This is perhaps the most striking example where *īśvara* represents the highest *brahman*. In Sureśvara, however,

²⁸ In BĀUBh (*parama-*)*īśvara* occurs 48 times, in TaittūBh 16, in KaUBh 10, in ĪUBh four times. In BSBh, which is similar in size to BĀUBh, only *parameśvara* occurs around 150 times, while *īśvara* occurs hundreds of times.

²⁹ BĀUBh 1.5.20, p. 709, lines 20f: *tatheśvarasyāpy aparicchinnātmano mamatavatādiduḥkhanimittamithyājñānādidoṣābhāvāt naiva duḥkham upajāyate* | “Similarly, *īśvara*, whose Self is without division, is not affected by suffering because there are no defects of false knowledge and others like notions of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ that are the cause of suffering.”

³⁰ TaittUBh 2.8.5, p. 309, line 26 *yeṣāṃ punar īśvaro ‘nya ātmanaḥ kāryaṃ cānyat teṣāṃ bhayānivr̥t̥tiḥ* ...
 “Still for those for whom *īśvara* is distinct from the *ātman*, and creation is distinct from both, for them there is no elimination of fear...”

(*parama-*) *īśvara* is mentioned much more often, together with, due to the meter, the abbreviated form *īśa*. The term *sarveśvara* also often occurs in Sureśvara, but is unusual for Śaṅkara and Padmapāda. In many examples, it is again difficult to determine what is meant by (*parama-/sarva-*)*īśvara* / *īśa*. However, for example in BĀUBhV 1.4.376 (the same verse appears also as 3.7.44), *īśvara* most probably denotes the highest *brahman*: “The Lord is ever omniscient, omnipotent, self of all, present in all, immovable, and the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the world.”³¹ (tr. Jog & Hino 1993, p. 125). In NaiṣkS *īśvara* appears always as conditioned *brahman*; in Naiṣk S 1.47 actions are dedicated to *īśvara* in order to purify the mind; in 2.111, highest *brahman* should be known as “I am him” (*tam asmi*), not as *īśvara*; in NaiṣS 4.44, *īśvara* has the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of ignorance which makes him the seer of “I” and others (*ahamādidṛś*). In TaittUBhV 1.71 *parameśvara* is the syllable *om*, lord of all desires, and Indra. On the other hand, in 1.185 guru is one with *īśvara*. In already mentioned 2.378 *īśvara* creates the world through *māyā* and enters into it.

In short, Sureśvara uses the term very similarly to Śaṅkara in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads; in most cases it is clear that *īśvara* is a conditioned *brahman*, sometimes it cannot be determined, and the highest *brahman* is very rarely referred to with the term *īśvara*. Therefore, in Padmapāda and Sureśvara there is still no attempt for terminological systematization of *īśvara* as a conditioned *brahman*.

Maṇḍanamiśra pays less attention to the issues of the conditioned and the supreme *brahman* and focuses more on epistemological problems. This does not mean that he does not mention *īśvara*; the term (*parama-*, *sarva-*)*īśvara* appears some dozen times in Brahmasiddhi plus *aiśvarya* that occurs just as often. However, the tendency towards systematizing the terminology does not yet exist.

The same is with Vācaspatimiśra, who does not yet use the term systematically. In Bhāmatī, *īśvara* appears quite often, although very often as a citation form Śaṅkara. As an example, in Bhāmatī 1.1.1 (p. 44) the term *īśvara* denotes the highest *brahman* and is used synonymously with the word *ātman*.³²

In Iṣṭasiddhi, *īśvara* does not occur often and one gets the impression that this issue is rather unimportant for Vimuktātman. The situation is different in Jñānaghana’s

³¹ BĀUBhV 1.4.376: *sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktiś ca sarvātmā sarvago dhruvaḥ | jagajjanisthitidhvaṃsahetur eṣa sarveśvaraḥ || 376 ||*

³² ... *sa īśvaras tatpadārtha ātmā* “he, the Lord, to whom ‘that’ refers, is the Self”

Tattvaśuddhi, where an attempt to systematize and clearly define the term is visible. In the fourth chapter, which discusses *īśvara*'s omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), on p. 21, it is explained that the very nature of *īśvara* is omniscience, and that *īśvara* is the material cause of the world (*upādānakaraṇa*). *īśvara* is reflected through *māyā*, he is the cause of the emergence of individual souls (*jīva*) limited by the adjunct of *avidyā*. In the following, on p. 22, Jñānaghana speaks of *brahman* associated with the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of *māyā* implicitly probably referring to *īśvara* as the passage appears in the context of the discussion of *īśvara*'s omniscience. The fifth chapter discusses the material and efficient cause of the world; the long *pūrvapakṣa* claims that *īśvara* cannot be a material but only an efficient cause. The crux of Jñānaghana's response (pp. 24–25) is that *brahman* is by his own being eternal, pure, conscious and free, but through the limiting adjunct of inexplicable *māyā* appears as the material and efficient cause of the world. Here, too, it is not explicitly stated that *īśvara* is *brahman* reflected through *māyā*, but the context of the whole chapter is a discussion about *īśvara*. The clear explanation will finally come in the chapter 38 (pp. 240–245) which deals with the relation of the individual soul (*jīva*) and *brahman*. Initially, *pūrvapakṣin* tries to prove the difference between the individual soul and the absolute, and uses the terms *brahman* and *īśvara* as synonyms. In response, Jñānaghana clears up the confusion by strictly separating the terms *īśvara* and *brahman*. On pp. 243–244, Jñānaghana explicitly says: “Therefore, *brahman*, reflected in ignorance ... is known as *īśvara*. *Brahman*'s consciousness, reflected in the internal organ is called *jīva*.”³³ On p. 244 we find “[*brahman*'s consciousness] when limited by *māyā* is designated as the highest *īśvara*, when limited by the internal organ it is designated as *jīva*.”³⁴

It is obvious that Jñānaghana uses *paramēśvara* and *īśvara* as synonyms, as well as *avidyā* and *māyā*. It seems to me that in Tattvaśuddhi, for the first time, a distinction was consistently made between the highest *brahman* on the one hand and his reflection in *avidyā* / *māyā* called *īśvara* and *jīva*. It also seems that the term (*param*-)*īśvara* is not used in Tattvaśuddhi for the highest *brahman*.

³³ TŚ pp. 243 (line 13)–244 (line 1): *tasmās avidyāpratibimbitaṃ brahmānavacchinnatvād īśvara iti gamyate | antaḥkaraṇapratibimbitaṃ brahmacaitanyaṃ jīvaśabdavācyam bhavati |*

³⁴ TŚ p. 244, line 11: *tataś ca tatra māyāvacchede paramēśvaratvavyavahārah, antaḥkaraṇāvacchede jīvatvavyavahārah*

In Prakāśātman, however, we do not find such a clear distinction as in Jñānaghana; it seems that the concept of *īśvara* does not play a large role for him. On pp. 211–212 Prakāśātman discusses *brahman* and *māyā* and material cause. The conclusion is similar to Jñānaghana's, that *brahman* distinguished through inexplicable *māyā* is the cause of the world.³⁵ However, a *brahman* reflected through *māyā* does not bear the name of *īśvara*. In the other passage (p. 212, line 8) the *brahman* is the cause, and the bearer of *māyā* which is the material cause (*upādāna*).³⁶

Sarvajñātman, however, at the very beginning of Saṃkṣepaśārīraka (1.20) clearly defines the terms *īśvara* and *jīva*. Ignorance (*ajñāna*) by its power of concealment (*āvaraṇa*) and projection (*vibhrama*) conceals the highest *ātman* and projects on him the false phenomena of the world, *īśvara* and *jīva*.³⁷ Terminologically, this stanza is interesting because, besides *āvaraṇa* 'concealing', he uses the term *vibhrama* 'disturbance, error and then illusion' instead of classical, post-Śāṅkarite *vikṣepa* 'projecting'. Here, Sarvajñātman may have used the word *vibhrama* for metrical reasons, or perhaps because the terminology is not fully systematized. Elsewhere in the SaṃkṣṢ, Sarvajñātman systematically uses the word *īśvara* for a conditioned *brahman*.³⁸

This would mean that the systematic use of *īśvara* as a *brahman* that becomes a material and effective cause of the world under the veil of *māyā* was established at the beginning of the 11th century. That this is not so simple testifies the commentary on the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad attributed to Śāṅkara. According to my previous study

³⁵ PañcPV (p. 212, line 5): *tasmād anīrvacanīyamāyāvīśiṣṭaṃ kāraṇaṃ brahmeti*

³⁶ PañcPV (p. 212, line 8): *jagadupādānamāyāśrayatayā brahma kāraṇam iti*

³⁷ SaṃkṣṢ 1.20: *ācchādya vikṣipati saṃspṃhuradātmarūpaṃ jīveśvaratvajagadākṛtibhir mṛṣaiva | ajñānam āvaraṇavibhramaśaktiyogād ātmatvamātraviṣayāśrayatābalena ||* "Ignorance, because the Self is its bearer and content, by applying the power of concealment and projection, conceals the form of the glittering Self, projecting falsely on it the illusory appearance of the world, *īśvara* and personal soul."

³⁸ Cf. 1.49 where the *ātman* manifests itself as seeing (*dṛś*) which is why the individual soul (*jīva*) is distinguished from the supreme Lord (*parameśvara*). In 2.189 consciousness (*caitanya*) creates divisions of the world, individual soul and *īśvara*. In this part of the text (2.175–192), Sarvajñātman describes in detail *īśvara* and the already indicated idea of the creative aspect of his, with the proviso that this creation is possible only under the veil of *māyā*. Cf. the beginning of the fifth chapter of Prapañcakriyā where *brahman* with the appearance of ignorance (*avidyāvasthā*) becomes the material (*prakṛti*) and efficient (*nimitta*) cause of the world, *īśvara*, etc.

(Andrijanić 2019), this text belongs to a later period than Śaṅkara, and a quote from Bṛhatsaṃhitā could place it in the period after the 12th century. However, in this commentary, the terms (*parama-*) *īśvara* are still used interchangeably with terms (*param-*)*brahma* / (*parama-*)*ātman*, which means that the systematization of the term *īśvara* did not reach the author of the commentary on ŚvU even a century or more after Sarvajñātman, although the use of the concept of *saccidānanda* (that might have arisen in Sarvajñātman’s time) is in the commentary on ŚvU completely utilized. Obviously, it took some time for certain concepts to take root among the Vedānata scholars.

Saccidānanda

According to Hacker (1950, p. 267), Śaṅkara mentions the blissful (*ānanda*) nature of *brahman* only when such an idea appears in the text interpreted by him.³⁹ The appearance of *ānanda*-nature in the text (if it does not appear in the context of the commentary) therefore eliminates the possibility of Śaṅkara’s authorship (cf. Mayeda 1965b, p. 186, as well as Ingalls 1952, p. 7). The notion of *saccidānanda* “existence-consciousness-bliss”, which in the later Advaita Vedānta, as well as in modern Hinduism, very often appears as a qualification of the highest *brahman*, does not appear in texts that can be reasonably considered Śaṅkara’s, nor before Śaṅkara, to the best of this author’s knowledge. In Śaṅkara (Upad 1.17.13), the first part of the compound (*sac-cid-*) occurs once, when Śaṅkara claims that *ātman* is not what is falsely assumed, but nothing but existence and consciousness (*saccinmātra*). The last member of the compound, *ānanda*, still does not occur. *Saccidānanda*, however, occurs few times in the Nṛsiṃha-pūrva- and Nṛsiṃha-uttara-tapanīyopaniṣad,⁴⁰ but in this moment it is not easy to date this Upaniṣad with certainty.⁴¹

The question that arises here is when did this concept develop and how. These three terms together do not occur with Śaṅkara’s direct successors Padmapāda and Sureśvara, nor with Maṇḍanamiśra and Vācaspatimiśra. They do not occur in

³⁹ E.g. BĀU 3.9.28, 4.1.6, 4.3.32-33; TaittU 2.5-9, 3.6 etc.

⁴⁰ NṛptU 1.7 (p. 17. line 3); NṛutU, fourth khaṇḍa, p. 109, line 1; sixth khaṇḍa, p. 123, line 1; seventh khaṇḍa p. 129, line 6.

⁴¹ *Saccidānanda* occurs several times in Tejobindūpaniṣad (cf. 3.26,31; 5.8, 36 etc.) which nevertheless seems like a younger text; according to Mallinson & Singleton (2017, p. 184), it was composed after the Haṭhpradīpika which dates from the 15th century.

Vimuktātman, Prakāśātman and Jñānaghana either, as much as I could check. However, in Sarvajñātman’s Saṃkṣepaśārīraka all three terms finally occur in the same phrase. In Saṃkṣ 1.174 and 1.540 the compound *sac-cit-sukha* occurs. In 1.226, 1.235 and 1.544 *sac-cid-ānanda* appears. It is obvious that in the first group *sukha* appears as a synonym for *ānanda*, perhaps for metrical reasons. Indeed, *sukha* appears in Saṃkṣ quite often in the sense of bliss that is the own form/being of the highest *brahman/ātman*.⁴² This interchangeability is unusual because of the importance of the term *ānanda* in the Upaniṣads.⁴³ If Śāṅkara refrains from qualifying *brahman* as *ānanda* ‘bliss’, it could be so because he refrains to some extent from any positive qualifications of the supreme *brahman*. Hacker (1950, p. 286) had remarked that in Advaita Vedānta after Vimuktātman the qualities (*guṇa*, *dharma*) of *brahman* were never discussed, but only his own being (*svabhāva*).⁴⁴ Here we must keep in mind that Maṇḍamamiśra (BrahS, p. 4–5) has already criticized the possibility that bliss (*ānanda*) is a property (*dharma*) of a *brahman*. In the context of the Upaniṣadic expression *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma* ‘perception, bliss, *brahman*’ (BĀU 3.9.28), an objection is made that if *ānanda* were a property, then *brahman* would be different from its perception (*vijñāna*) in a sense of a distinction between the bearer of the property (*dharmin*) and property (*dharma*) that would lead to a division in *brahman*. Maṇḍamamiśra takes the view (p. 5, lines 5ff) that bliss (*ānanda*) and discernment (*vijñāna*) are one in *brahman*, as in the Moon wherein splendour (*prakāśa*) and delight (*āhlāda*) are one, but are communicated in two words. Therefore, in Maṇḍamamiśra *ānanda* is already not a property of *brahman*.

Jñānaghana in chapter two of his Tattvaśuddhi (pp. 9–10) defends the thesis that *ānanda* is *brahman*’s own form (*svarūpa*) against the objection (p. 9) that *ānanda* is his quality (*guṇa*); *brahman* is without qualities (*nirguṇa*), and on p. 12 (line 9) Jñānaghana finally unequivocally asserts that bliss (*ānanda*) is *brahman*’s own form (*svarūpa*). In Tattvaśuddhi 37 (pp. 234–239), it is again discussed whether *ānanda*,

⁴² Cf. Saṃkṣ 1.22–25; but e.g. in 1.173, 180 *ānanda* occurs.

⁴³ In the older Upaniṣads, *sukha* occurs either in the context of well-being (ChU 7.22–23) or as the bliss experienced by the realized sages (e.g. KaU 5.12, PraśU 4.1); such use is present in some passages of the Bhagavadgītā (4.40; 5.13, 21; 6.7; etc.). However, in GK 3.47 the phrase *sukhaṃ uttamam* occurs that refers to the highest bliss. Also as a qualification of the highest being, *sukha* occurs at BhG 14.27.

which is now sometimes synonymously used with *sukha*, is an attribute (*guṇa*) of *ātman* or *ātman*'s own being/form (*svabhāva/svarūpa*). In Maṇḍanamiśra, *sukha* and *ānanda* are also equated,⁴⁵ but in the context of the debate over whether *ānanda* is the absence of pain, and whether the pursuit of the bliss of *brahman* is passion (*rāga*).

This terminology might be reflected in Sarvajñātman's treatment of the terms *sukha* and *ānanda* as synonyms. All three notions appear in the older Upaniṣads, and in all of them the highest truth is with some of them denoted; in Śaṅkara's Upad 1.17.13, *sat* 'existence' and *cit* 'consciousness' are joined together as, for Śaṅkara unusual, positive qualification of *brahman*. The model for *saccidānanda* is probably the term *viññānam ānandam brahma* (BĀU 3.9.28), where *sat* is added, and instead of *viññāna* stands *cit*. Leaving aside the Nṛsiṃha-pūrva- and -uttara-tapanīyopaniṣad, which we cannot date in this moment, it seems possible that *ānanda* is added to the formula by Sarvajñātman, that is, in the 11th century. The fact that the formula has not yet been fully stabilized, i.e. that *ānanda* occurs interchangeably with *sukha*, supports the claim that Sarvajñātman's use of the formula is early.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to determine more precisely when the concepts of *māyā*, *īśvara* and *saccidānanda* acquired the form that became common in the later Advaita Vedānta, and in modern Hinduism. All three terms are in Śaṅkara's use very different from the classical one; however, in some cases the direction of this development has already been outlined by Śaṅkara himself. This is the case with the concept of *īśvara* as a conditioned *brahman*. This is visible in the fact that, although Śaṅkara uses *īśvara* and *param-brahman* / *parama-ātman* interchangeably for the highest *brahman*, he does not use the terms (*param-*)*brahman* / (*parama-*)*ātman* for a conditioned *brahman*. On the other hand, even in Śaṅkara's own works, the tendency to consider *īśvara* as a conditioned *brahman* is evident in the fact that in commentaries on the Upaniṣads *īśvara* very rarely refers to a highest *brahman* unlike the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. In such a use of the term *īśvara*, as well as in an even more consistent use of *māyā* in the sense

⁴⁵ BrahS, p. 3, lines 14f. *tad evaṃ duḥkhanivṛtter anyat sukham | sa cānandaśabdasya mukhyo 'rthaḥ* | "Thus, pleasure is different from cessation of pain. And this is the primary meaning of the word bliss."

of magician's trickery, Upaniṣad commentaries differ from the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya which is another possible indication that the Upaniṣad commentaries and BSBh did not originate in the same period of Śaṅkara's literary activity.⁴⁶ Although for Jñānaghana *īśvara* is already a conditioned *brahman*, and Sarvajñātman precisely communicates this idea and outlines the concept, the interchangeability of terms for the highest and conditioned *brahman* persisted for some time as evident in the commentary on the ŚvU probably composed around 12th c. or later.

Maṇḍanamiśra was actually the one who played a decisive role in the idea that ignorance and *māyā* are the same, and that *māyā* is neither existing nor non-existent, but inexplicable. The root of the idea of *māyā* as the substance from which illusory phenomena is created, could be found in Vācaspatimiśra. This development, which was crystallized by Prakāśātman and Sarvajñātman, is quite independent of Śaṅkara. Unlike the idea of two powers of ignorance/*māyā* which, although also established by Maṇḍanamiśra, relies terminologically on Śaṅkara's commentary on BĀU 1.3.18 and 2.1.12 where the idea of concealment (*avarāṇa*) occurs.

Brahman as ānanda is an old Upaniṣadic concept and it is not surprising that in Vedānta there have been debates about whether *ānanda* is a quality or *brahman*'s own being. Śaṅkara bypassed the problem, referring to it only when the need for it occurs, while his successors found a way to incorporate the idea into the system without violating the principle of the totality of *brahman*. The very popular idea of *brahman* as existence, consciousness and bliss appeared relatively late, firstly only as existence and consciousness in Śaṅkara's Upadeśasahasrī, and then, probably from Sarvajñātman onwards, the formula takes its well-known form, although the compound is not yet fully stabilized as *sukha* appears interchangeably with *ānanda*. Maṇḍanamiśra, with his discussion of *ānanda*, which cannot be a property of *brahman*, and the equation of *sukha* and *ānanda*, again played a crucial role in shaping this classical Advaita concept.

Texts and abbreviations

BĀU = Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad

⁴⁶ In Andrijanić (2016) I tried to argue that the Upaniṣad commentaries were composed after BSBh.

- BĀUBh = Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya, *Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śaṅkarabhāṣya, Works of Śaṅkarācārya in original Sanskrit*, vol. 1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007 (first edition 1964).
- BĀUBhV = Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārtika (Sureśvara)
- Bhāmatī = Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkarabhāṣyam with the commentaries: Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā of Govindānanda, Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyanirṇaya of Ānandagiri. Ed. by J.L. Shastri. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.
- BhG = Bhagavadgītā
- BhGBh = Bhagavad-Gītā-Bhāṣya, Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya with Text and English Translation. Ed. & Tr. by Krishna Warriar, A.D. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 2007.
- BrahS = Brahmasiddhi by Ācārya Maṇḍanamīśra with commentary by Śaṅkhapāni. Ed. by Kuppaswami Sastri. Madras: Government oriental manuscript Series No. 4, 1937.
- BSBh = Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, Brahmasūtra with Śaṅkarabhāṣya, Works of Śaṅkarācārya in original Sanskrit, vol. III., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007 (first edition 1965).
- GK = Gauḍapādīya-Kārikā
- GKBh = Gauḍapādīya-Kārikā-Bhāṣya
- ĪUBh = Īśā-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya
- KaUBh = Kaṭha-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya
- MUBh = Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya
- NaiṣS = Naiṣkarmyasiddhi
- NṛptU/ NṛutU = Nṛsiṃhapūrvottaratapanīyopaniṣat. Śrīmac-Chaṅkrācārya-viracita-pūrvotapanīyabhāṣya-Vidyāraṇya-praṇītottaratapanīya-dīpikābhyāṃ sametā. Ed. Vināyaka Gaṇeśa Āpte, Ānandāśramasamskṛtagranthāvaliḥ 30, 1929 (1st ed. 1895).
- PañcP = Pañcapādikā, The Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda, Vol. II. Part I. Sanskrit Text. Ed. Rāmaśāstrī Bhāgavatāchārya. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 3. Benares: E.J. Lazarus & Co. 1891.
- PañcPV = Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa of Prakāśātman with the extracts from Tattvadīpana and Bhāvaprakāśikā, Vol. III. Sanskrit Text. Ed. Rāmaśāstrī Bhāgavatāchārya. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series No. 5. Benares: E.J. Lazarus & Co. 1892.
- SamkṣŚ = Samkṣepasārīraka

TaittUBh = Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya, *Ten Principal Upaniṣads with Śaṅkarabhāṣya, Works of Śaṅkarācārya in original Sanskrit*, vol. 1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2007 (first edition 1964).

TaittUBhV = Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārtika (Sureśvara)

TŚ = *Tattvaśuddhi of Jñānaghanapāda*, edited by Suryanarayana Shastri and E.P. Radhakrishnan. Madras: University of Madras (1941).

Upad = Upadeśasāhasrī

PraśUBh = Praśna-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya

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